In a variety of circumstances, state governors exercise independent decisionmaking power over matters affecting the foreign policy of the United States. This Essay describes and defends this emerging system of gubernatorial foreign policy on both legal and functional grounds. Recent Supreme Court decisions retreating from federal exclusivity in foreign affairs and prohibiting the commandeering of state executive officials leave a small doctrinal space for governors to act independently on matters affecting foreign policy. This small space has been further expanded by the federal government's practice of imposing limitations on the preemptive effect of treaties and international agreements. A system of gubernatorial foreign policy also represents the most practical and feasible way to accommodate the internationalizing pressure of globalization with a continuing federal system of "dual sovereignties." Under this system, the states will continue to improve their capacity to deal with matters affecting foreign affairs, and the federal government will retain the right to preempt, but not to commandeer, state governors in the service of federal foreign policy goals.
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A. A Constitutional Space for a Gubernatorial Foreign Policy 2398 Osbaldo Torres, a Mexican national convicted of multiple murders by Oklahoma courts, was scheduled to be executed on May 18. Not only was the Mexican government urgently lobbying the governor's office on Torres's behalf, but the Governor was also considering a judgment issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) purporting to require him to suspend Torres's execution and to order a new hearing to consider the effect of treaty violations on Torres's conviction and sentence.' At the same time, attorneys for Torres were urgently seeking an order from Oklahoma's highest court of criminal appeals to stay the execution based on the ICJ's order. ' On the morning of May 13, the Oklahoma court suspended the execution and ordered a new hearing pursuant to the ICJ judgment.' A few hours later, Governor Henry announced at a press conference that he had commuted Torres's sentence to life imprisonment, thereby removing most of the legal basis for Torres's appeal under the ICJ judgment. 4 As the Governor, the state's highest criminal court, the Mexican government, and the ICJ struggled to resolve Torres's fate, one entity was curiously absent: the U.S. federal government. According to news reports, the State Department had contacted Governor Henry's office but had merely urged him to consider the ICJ's judgment. 5 The federal government did not intervene in the litigation in the Oklahoma state courts. The Governor was not ordered by the President to commute Torres's sentence. Rather, the Governor exercised his own discretion in making that decision. 6 The President's passivity is surprising because it is an axiom of U.S. foreign relations law that the President is the leading authority, perhaps even the "sole organ, ''7 for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, it is nearly as axiomatic that state governments are not granted an independent role in conducting foreign policy. 8 Yet in this case, a potentially important diplomatic issue was left entirely to the discretion of the Governor of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma state courts. Indeed, although the State Department issued statements in previous ICJ cases involving similar issues, none of the statements "ordered" or "commanded" the governors in those cases; each governor made an independent decision about whether and how to comply with the ICJ's judgments. 9 To be sure, in a subsequent case involving the effect of the same ICJ judgment on a Texas execution, the President intervened by releasing a memorandum purporting to order the Texas courts to follow the ICJ's judgment. 1 " The constitutionality of this order will be tested in the near future, but even if upheld, it applies only to state courts, and not to governors. 1 ' For a variety of reasons, both legal and political, state governors will retain some measure of independent discretion to exercise their powers in ways that might affect and indeed determine aspects of U.S. foreign policy.
Governors exercise this limited but important foreign policy power in a variety of contexts. In addition to the power to respond to requests by foreign governments and international institutions, governors also negotiate and execute certain kinds of international agreements in pursuit of regional or international cooperation. Governors and other state executive officials administer insurance regulations and state purchasing regulations in pursuit of certain foreign policy goals. In these admittedly limited but hardly unimportant areas, a gubernatorial foreign policy is beginning to emerge.
My goal in this Essay is to redirect the existing academic conversation on state governments and foreign affairs. While scholars have considered the legal and policy consequences of state activities in foreign affairs, 1 2 they have not considered the unique role of governors in the state foreign policy process. Nor have scholars considered the usefulness of a governor-led system of state foreign policy as an accommodation between the forces of globalization and the domestic federal system.
My discussion proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces and defines a system of gubernatorial foreign policy. Part II argues that notwithstanding the traditional understanding of exclusive federal control over foreign affairs, existing constitutional doctrine still permits states to exercise limited independence in matters affecting foreign affairs. I conclude in Part III that this system of gubernatorial foreign policy represents the most practical and feasible accommodation of the forces of globalization and a system of dual sovereignties envisioned by the U.S. constitutional structure.
I. A SYSTEM OF GUBERNATORIAL FOREIGN POLICY
In this Part, I introduce and define a system of gubernatorial foreign policy. I then examine three examples of this system in action.
A. Defining a Gubernatorial Foreign Policy
Executive officials of a particular state often take actions that implicate the foreign relations of the United States as a whole. Such actions become a "gubernatorial foreign policy" when a governor or other state executive official takes that action independent of federal government supervision or control. 13 The level of gubernatorial independence from the federal government, however, varies depending on the situation.
12. See In some cases, governors act with the full acquiescence of the federal government to deal with a matter implicating foreign affairs. In these instances, governors act at the height of their foreign policy powers because the federal government has expressly endorsed their activities. In other cases, gubernatorial activities are taken without either express approval or opposition by the federal government. Because the federal government's views are often uncertain on foreign policy matters facing governors, many of the gubernatorial foreign policy activities I describe belong to this second category. Finally, certain gubernatorial activities are taken with the express disapproval of the federal government. In these circumstances, the governors' foreign policy powers are highly restricted. As I will argue in Part II, however, there are a few circumstances in which a governor's decision on how to proceed is constitutionally protected from federal control.
Not all gubernatorial foreign policy activities have the same legal character. Like exercises of the federal executive's foreign policy power, exercises of a state executive's foreign policy power take place within a complex and uncertain web of legal authorizations, prohibitions, and limitations. Some of these activities might be said to encroach upon federal powers, while others might be constitutionally shielded from federal control. But all represent an important and insufficiently studied component of the foreign policy system of the United States.
B. Examples of Gubernatorial Foreign Policy
In this Section, I review three examples of gubernatorial foreign policy in action. First, governors engage in foreign policy when they take primary responsibility for responding to demands by foreign governments and international institutions. Second, governors engage in foreign policy when they negotiate and sign international and regional agreements on behalf of their states. Finally, governors and other members of a state's executive branch take foreign policy actions when they impose sanctions or other economic limitations on doing business with particular foreign countries. Each type of gubernatorial foreign policy reflects some level of independence from federal government control.
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Responding to Demands by Foreign Governments and International Institutions
States have always played an important role in responding to demands by foreign governments and international institutions.' 4 The most dramatic examples of this role can be found in conflicts between the state administration of capital punishment and the United States' international obligations. These conflicts highlight the central position that governors hold when dealing with demands by foreign governments and international organizations.
The administration of capital punishment by the states has drawn intense criticism from foreign governments as well as from international institutions. '5 Aside from general moral disapproval, foreign critics have also alleged that the death penalty violates certain U.S. obligations under international law. As discussed below, these international obligations provide foreign governments and international institutions with a basis for demanding a change in U.S. death penalty practices.
Although the challenged death penalty practices implicate the obligations of the entire United States, the federal government has generally referred both foreign governments and international institutions to a particular state ' The federal government's official response to these notes is not publicly available, but according to Mexico, the responses offered nothing more than diplomatic apologies for the failure to comply with treaty obligations when arresting the Mexican nationals.' 8 In some cases, the federal government also forwarded the diplomatic notes directly to the governors of the states where the violations had occurred. ' 9 The governors who received these notes, however, generally rejected the Mexican protests and defended their right to arrest and eventually execute the Mexican nationals in question. In one case, the Governor of Texas received a personal communication from the President of Mexico, and the Secretary of State of Texas received a personal visit from Mexico's diplomatic representatives."
In addition to foreign governments, international institutions have also requested or even demanded that the United States suspend death sentences imposed on both U.S. and foreign nationals. For instance, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the human rights arm of the Organization of American States (OAS),21 has issued a number of requests seeling the suspension of executions alleged to violate U.S. obligations under international human rights law. 2 A number of these formal requests have been sent directly to state governors, however, rather than to the federal government. For instance, in 1993 the IACHR sent a request directly to the Governor of Texas requesting that the Governor stay the execution of U.S. Virginia counterpart, the Governor of Arizona decided to proceed with the execution.
18.
33
Both the Virginia and Arizona cases provide unusually powerful examples of the system of gubernatorial foreign policy in action. The ICJ's provisional measures orders represented both a legal obligation and a foreign policy challenge. When U.S. courts refused to enforce the orders, responding to the ICJ's orders became a question of foreign policy. This foreign policy question did not involve only U.S. relations with countries like Paraguay and Germany, but also U.S. relations with the ICJ itself, which serves as the primary judicial arm of the United Nations system. Each member of the United Nations, for instance, has an obligation to carry out ICJ judgments in cases to which it is a party. 34 Yet despite these various foreign policy implications, the ultimate decision of how to respond to the ICJ orders was left to the Governors of Virginia and Arizona without any direct intervention by the federal government.
The central role of state governors is confirmed by the complicated U.S. response to the most recent ICJ Vienna Convention decision in Avena. 3 1 In that case, brought by Mexico, the ICJ ordered the provision of judicial remedies to fifty-one Mexican nationals facing death sentences in the United States. 6 Although the federal government has intervened in the cases of these individuals, even that federal intervention was calculated to allow state executives to make the initial foreign policy decision.
The very first case testing the effect of the ICJ's judgment in Avena occurred in Oklahoma. As discussed earlier, even though the Oklahoma court eventually decided to give effect to the ICJ's order, Governor Henry had already decided to respond to the twin pressures of Mexico and the ICJ by granting clemency to Torres, the condemned Mexican national. 3 7 Facing almost identical facts, however, the Governor of Texas announced that he would not accede to the ICJ's judgment ordering him to stop the execution of U.S.) (Sept. 16, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/ igusframe.htm (follow "Written Pleadings" hyperlink). When Germany persisted with the case after the execution, Arizona went so far as to dispatch its Attorney General (later Governor) to The Hague to defend Arizona's actions before the ICJ. Verbatim Record 2.1-2.58, LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Nov. 14, 2000) available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (follow "Oral Pleadings" hyperlink).
34. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 ("Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.").
35. Avena Judgment, supra note 1.
Id.
138-141.
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See supra text accompanying notes 1-6. another Mexican national, Jose Medellin. 8 Texas's refusal to act prompted federal intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to consider the legal effect of the ICJ's judgment. 39 The federal government intervened once again when President Bush issued a memorandum purporting to require Texas state courts to comply with the ICJ's judgment with respect to Mexican nationals facing execution in Texas. 4°T his might suggest an end to the use of gubernatorial foreign policy to respond to ICJ judgments. However, the careful phrasing of the memorandum reveals that the federal government remains reluctant to compel state compliance with federal foreign policy goals. 41 The President's memorandum is directed not at the Governor of Texas but at the state courts. Moreover, it directs those courts to apply principles of "comity" in order to implement the ICJ's judgment rather than simply requiring compliance with the ICJ's judgment as a matter of legal obligation. Indeed, the legal effect of even the President's memorandum is being challenged in Texas courts. 42 All of this carefully circumscribed language suggests that the federal government will continue to leave room for a gubernatorial foreign policy in future cases involving international tribunal judgments.
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International Agreements
The role of governors in responding to demands by foreign governments and international institutions is probably the most dramatic example of a gubernatorial foreign policy. But governors can also take a more direct and assertive role in foreign policy by negotiating and entering into international agreements. 43 Although these agreements generally are made only with foreign regional governments, they are far from trivial. These agreements seek to regulate a variety of international matters such as fuel tax allocation, crossborder motor vehicle regulation, natural resources management, and even greenhouse gas emissions. Governors negotiate and sign such agreements either pursuant to their independent state constitutional authority or pursuant to a specific statutory authorization.
a. Bilateral Agreements
The most common and unremarkable form of state international agreement is a bicultural exchange agreement with a foreign government. 44 As a report released by the National Governors Association observed, states use bilateral cultural exchange agreements to bolster their economic relationships with certain foreign countries. To take just one example, at least twenty-five states have signed bilateral trade, cultural, and educational agreements with Israel. 4 " Such agreements are generally made during a governor's visit to a particular foreign country. For instance, Governor Gray Davis of California signed an agreement for cooperation in the development of biotechnology during his 1999 visit to Israel., 6 Many of these agreements are phrased in nonbinding terms, but as a National Governors Association study of these agreements suggests, they are increasingly common and important 
1999,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/cabio.html (establishing a "formal relationship between the Israel Biotechnology Organization and the California Governor's Commission on Bioscience in order to foster technology, business development and educational opportunities, through business interaction in the public and private sectors").
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b. Multilateral Agreements
Governors also take the lead in the negotiation and implementation of broad multilateral agreements involving several states and foreign provinces. Perhaps the most successful example of a state multilateral agreement is the Great Lakes Charter, an agreement among seven U.S. states and two Canadian provinces to cooperatively manage the waters of the Great Lakes. 4 The original charter, signed in 1985, committed the parties to develop mechanisms for cooperating in the management of the Great Lakes resources. While the precise definition of a "compact" remains uncertain, 9 compacts may include agreements between different U.S. states as well as agreements between U.S. states and foreign states (although some agreements with foreign governments may not rise to the level of a compact). Both kinds of compacts require congressional approval. 6°E ven compacts requiring congressional approval, however, represent a form of gubernatorial foreign policy. Agreements such as the Great Lakes Charter were negotiated by governors directly with other governors and with foreign provincial leaders. The federal executive played no official role in the negotiations.6i It did not, for instance, sign any of the agreements. Congress's role is only to approve or disapprove the compact negotiated by the governors.
This last example illustrates how state executives can shape foreign policy in cooperation with the federal government. State governors in this case play the role otherwise held by the federal executive in the negotiation of a typical international agreement. Indeed, because the distinction between a compact requiring congressional approval and an agreement that can be made by the states alone is hardly self-evident, state governors may have the authority to make agreements with foreign governments that are never reviewed by the federal government. At least one state court has recognized that some agreements with foreign governments do not rise to the level of a compact Governors have also negotiated and entered into international agreements that may actually differ from the .foreign policies pursued by the federal government. A number of U.S. governors, for instance, have joined with a number of Canadian provinces to set greenhouse gas reduction goals. 6 4 This agreement committed parties, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 199o levels by 201o, and to ten percent below 199o levels by 2020. 65 These goals were similar to the reduction goals set in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change. 6 6 Of course, the United States famously has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and to commit itself to the Protocol's aggressive targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 67
These and other state international agreements represent a softer, less dramatic example of gubernatorial foreign policy. Governors negotiate, sign, and implement agreements with foreign governments or at least subnational entities of foreign governments. All of these agreements implicate overall U.S. foreign relations by establishing cross-border cooperation, by building U.S. ties to countries such as Israel, or by adopting a position on the necessity of international cooperation to secure a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. All of these agreements place governors at the center of a foreign policy process, from which the federal government may often be excluded. 
Executive Actions Pursuant to Statutory Authorization
The final example of gubernatorial foreign policy illustrates how governors act in cooperation with their state legislatures. It also illustrates how nongubernatorial executive officials may be authorized to take actions that implicate foreign policy.
State legislatures have enacted a number of statutes that directly impact foreign affairs. The most controversial statutes require businesses that apply for state contracts to certify that they avoid business transactions with certain foreign countries. 68 Less aggressively, some statutes require businesses applying for state contracts to certify that their business in certain foreign countries complies with non-discriminatory principles. 
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF A GUBERNATORIAL FOREIGN POLICY
The system of gubernatorial foreign policy I have described appears at odds with the usual conception of federal government domination over foreign affairs. In this Part, I examine the legal basis for the system of gubernatorial foreign policy. I conclude that even the most extreme form of gubernatorial foreign policy-in which a governor acts in conflict with the policy of the federal government-is consistent with existing understandings of the balance between federal and state powers under the Constitution.
The federal government's political branches have accepted and even buttressed these constitutional understandings by clearing out a constitutional space for a gubernatorial foreign policy. In a number of circumstances, the federal government has even declared that it will rely on state governments to carry out many of its international obligations. Without the power to commandeer the states, however, this means that the implementation of these international obligations is within the discretion of state governors.
A. A Constitutional Space for a Gubernatorial Foreign Policy
The constitutional framework supporting the operation of a gubernatorial foreign policy has two doctrinal components. First, while the Supreme Court has found that the federal government preempted a number of state activities in recent years, it has refrained from endorsing a theory of federal exclusivity over foreign affairs. This means that governors are generally free to engage in foreign policy activities absent express preemption by Congress or the President. 73 
The Retreat from Federal Exclusivity
The theory of federal exclusivity holds that state governments cannot encroach on matters implicating foreign affairs, whether or not the federal government has actually approved a treaty, statute, executive agreement, or declaration with respect to the particular foreign policy issue. 74 This view enjoys broad support among commentators, 7 " and a number of the Court's decisions have also embraced this approach.7 6 For instance, on one occasion, the Supreme Court went so far as to declare that, for the purposes of foreign affairs, the "state[s] .... do[] not exist.
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The most powerful judicial articulation of the theory of federal exclusivity is found in Zschernig v. Miller. 8 In Zschernig, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute limiting the rights of foreigners to inherit real property if the inheriting foreign national's home country did not give U.S. citizens similar rights. 79 The Court's decision depended on a theory of exclusivity because the Court did not find that the state statute had been expressly preempted by any treaty, statute, or presidential order. Instead, the Court held that state laws "must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy. "8°s tatute preempted a Massachusetts statute barring state entities from buying goods or services from companies that did business with the nation of Burma). Since the Zschernig decision, the Court has not reaffirmed the federal exclusivity approach despite having had several opportunities to do so.8' The Court's most recent decision in American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi reflects this reluctance. The lower court in that case had invoked Zschernig to invalidate a California statute targeting foreign insurance companies for failing to pay World War II-related policies, on the ground that the statute interfered with the federal foreign affairs power;2 the Supreme Court, however, took a different approach. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Souter relied on executive agreements between the United States and German governments as evidence that the federal government had preempted California's statute. Although these agreements did not explicidy preempt California law, the Court found them to be evidence of an "unmistakabl[e]" policy to negotiate a resolution to the insurance coverage dispute. s The Court's opinion thus avoided adopting Zschernig's exclusivity view, at least in its broadest formulation. Instead, the Court suggested that its approach followed Justice Harlan's concurrence in Zschernig, which would require preemption of state law if "state legislation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government. ' Garamendi has been criticized for giving the federal executive branch too much discretion in its power to preempt state law. 8 7 Even so, Garamendi's approach still leaves room for a system of gubernatorial foreign policy. If the Court had revived Zschernig's approach, almost all of the activities I described in Part I would be subject to immediate preemption by federal courts whether or not the federal executive or legislative branches had acted. But the Supreme Court's reluctance to reaffirm Zschernig's theory of broad federal exclusivity suggests that there is doctrinal room for a gubernatorial foreign policy absent a clearly conflicting treaty, statute, executive agreement, or presidential declaration. Even in such a case, the Court would, per Justice Souter, weigh the strength of the state's interest against the federal claim of preemption.
Commandeering
While a system of gubernatorial foreign policy can survive under the Supreme Court's approach in Garamendi, the Court still recognizes the federal government's power to preempt (through treaty, statute, or executive act) almost all forms of state activities affecting foreign affairs. This express preemptive power was broadly endorsed by both the Crosby and Garamendi decisions and could effectively wipe out almost all forms of gubernatorial foreign policy. But the federal government's preemptive power is not unconstrained. Rather, it is limited by the constitutional prohibitions on the commandeering of states and state executive officials.
a. New York v. United States and Printz v. United States
In addition to its decisions limiting the federal government's exercise of power pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 8 the Supreme Court has imposed limitations on the federal government's ability to "commandeer" state governments to carry out federal policies. Unlike the Court's other federalism decisions, New York and Printz do not place constitutional limitations on the subject matter of federal regulations. Rather, the decisions limit how the federal government may pursue its regulatory objectives. Thus, even if the federal government has an unquestioned constitutional authority to regulate, the anti-commandeering decisions nevertheless prevent the federal government from requiring state executive officials to carry out its regulatory plan.
According to the Court, the prohibition on anti-commandeering reflects the Constitution's commitment to a dual system of sovereignties, including both the federal and state governments. 
b. Commandeering and Foreign Affairs
Neither New York nor Printz discussed whether the constitutional prohibition on commandeering also applies to the federal government's power to conduct foreign affairs. Nor has the Court addressed this question in later decisions discussing or applying the anti-commandeering doctrine. 9 " Scholars, however, have highlighted the potential significance of the anticommandeering principle, particularly as it was applied in Printz, to the federal government's efforts to exercise its foreign affairs powers against the states through the treaty power.
Professor Vizquez, for instance, argued that the primary legal justification for the anti-commandeering principle-namely, the Tenth Amendment's recognition of state sovereignty-does not apply to exercises of the federal treaty power.9 8 He cited Justice Holmes's famous holding in Missouri v. Holland 99 that the treaty power is not limited by any "invisible radiation" of the Tenth Amendment.' Unlike the federal government's exercise of domestic constitutional powers, the federal treaty power does not infringe on any aspect of state sovereignty recognized by the Tenth Amendment because there are no limitations on the subjects that can be regulated by treaties."' While compelling, this critique of anti-commandeering in the foreign affairs context fails to grapple with the important distinction between the power to make a treaty and the power to implement a treaty's obligations. The Constitution plainly allocates to the federal government the exclusive power to make treaties by negotiating, signing, ratifying, and acceding to treaties with foreign governments.°2 This power to make treaties is not reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. But it does not follow that the Constitution and it is generally accepted that treaties are equivalent to federal statutes.' s But it is also generally accepted that many treaties are "non-self-executing" in the sense that they do not have domestic legal effect unless and until they are separately implemented. o 6 And even some "self-executing" treaties cannot be enforced by courts because they do not create private causes of action.
7
A common mechanism for implementing a treaty's obligations, as Chief Justice Marshall noted, is a new federal statute specifically designed to implement the treaty. ' 8 But this is not the only mechanism. Some treaties may be implemented by presidential action, '°9 while others may be implemented by state governments. 0 The variety of domestic legal mechanisms for implementing treaties suggests that the constitutional power to implement a treaty is not necessarily coterminous with the constitutional power to make a treaty. The fact that the President or Congress has some power to implement treaties, for instance, does not mean that either institution's implementing actions are free of constitutional constraints imposed by either federalism or 103. The treaty power is only one of the foreign affairs powers that might be invoked against the states. A similar distinction might limit the federal government's power to invoke customary international law against the states. While Congress and the President hold the power to recognize rules of customary international law as binding on the U.S. government, their power to implement these rules against the states is still constrained by the Constitution's anti-commandeering prohibitions. obligations under various international human rights treaties).
11o. See Ku, supra note 9, at 499-510 (describing state implementation of treaties involving private international law).
separation of powers. Indeed, as Professor Rosenkranz has forcefully argued, Congress may not be able to rely upon its delegated authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause when implementing a treaty by legislation. 1 Rather, Congress may need to rely upon its other delegated powers to enact legislation implementing a treaty. For this reason, when the federal government implements (as opposed to makes) a treaty, it is almost certainly limited by the same Tenth Amendment principles that limit its activities in the domestic sphere. Many of the same concerns animating the anti-commandeering prohibition in the domestic context can be invoked in the treaty-implementation context as well. For instance, in the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the federal government obligated itself to notify consulates whenever a foreign national was arrested in the United States.' 12 As in Printz, state officials are absorbing all of the costs of and responsibility for implementing this federal obligation. Without having any input in the development of the policy, states are "put in the position of taking the blame for [a federal obligation's] burdensomeness and for its defects."" 3 This burden on the states is not an unavoidable consequence of federal control over the treaty power because there are other non-commandeering methods for the federal government to fulfill its treaty obligations. It could implement its obligations by, for instance, creating a private right of action in federal courts for foreign nationals to challenge violations of their consular rights. 114 It could even pass legislation imposing conditions on federal spending that would require state and local officials to comply with treaty obligations."' These alternative methods could thus accomplish the federal (and international) regulatory objective without commandeering state and local officials. 
115.
As far as I know, this method has never been tried in the context of treaty implementation.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court is likely to uphold any conditional spending legislation against Tenth Amendment challenges. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987) (rejecting an "independent constitutional bar" to the use of the spending power to compel state action).
B. Expanding the Constitutional Space
Even assuming that the federal foreign affairs power is not exclusive and that the federal government lacks the power to commandeer state officials, the federal government continues to avail itself of a number of mechanisms to compel adherence to national foreign policies. Surprisingly, the federal government has emphatically chosen not to wield its most expansive and unchallenged power: preemption by treaty or statute. The choice to avoid preemption by limiting the domestic effect of a treaty, combined with the judicial prohibition on commandeering, carves out further space for state governors to exercise independent discretion in certain matters affecting foreign affairs.
Responding to Foreign Demands
States often become involved in foreign policy when a foreign government requests or demands that the United States alter some aspect of its domestic regulation or practice.11 6 The federal government has adopted a number of strategies to respond to the often justifiable protests from foreign governments."
7 There is one strategy, however, that the federal government appears never to have adopted in response to foreign government demands. It has never ordered or "commandeered" state officials to comply with the demands of a foreign government or to carry out U.S. international law obligations."' Instead, it has permitted the state governments to make the ultimate decision over how and even whether to comply with foreign demands. Indeed, the federal government has consistently relied on the state governments to carry out its international obligations to international tribunals." 9 When defending its actions before the ICJ, the federal government emphasized the sovereign status of the states: "The separate states are not subsidiary bodies subordinate to the power of the Federal Government and subject to its direction. Rather, they remain sovereign and are the masters of their affairs within the areas of responsibility reserved to them by the United States Constitution. ' " 20 This record of historical and modern practice does more than simply support the proposition that the "commandeering" prohibition applies to state officials in foreign policy contexts. Even if the federal government has such a commandeering power, it has emphatically chosen not to exercise it. Thus, even if it is not constitutionally constrained from interfering with the states, the federal government has often left the decision of how to respond to foreign governments' demands to the independent judgment of state officials.
Treaty Limitations
Though the federal government has refrained from attempting to commandeer or otherwise interfere with state governors in response to demands from foreign governments, it does have the acknowledged power to preempt state activities through treaty, statute, executive agreement, or executive declaration.' 2 ' Assuming that Missouri v. Holland remains good law,' 22 the federal government still has broad powers to eliminate state activities that interfere in foreign affairs. Surprisingly, the federal government has chosen not to exercise this power against the states. To the contrary, it has imposed severe limitations on its own ability to preempt state activity through treaties. These limitations carve out even more space for discretionary gubernatorial actions affecting foreign policy.
The most dramatic examples of the federal government's self-imposed limitations are found in reservations, understandings, and declarations 121. The first three methods have long been recognized. See HENKIN, supra note 74, at (explaining that "there is no reason why a treaty, an executive agreement, a judicial doctrine or any federal regulation" should not preempt state law). attached to the ratification of international agreements.' 2 3 These "RUDs" are usually conditions imposed by the Senate before giving advice and consent to treaties. In the trade context, the limitations are contained in legislation approving and implementing trade agreements. Although these limitations take different forms, all have the same legal consequence: They prevent international agreements from preempting, commandeering, or otherwise restricting the ability of state officials to act in matters affecting foreign affairs. For instance, a number of state laws and activities have been challenged as violations of U.S. obligations under international trade agreements.'2 4 But states are largely free to ignore such findings, which do not have any direct effect in the U.S. domestic system. In approving the agreements, Congress specifically prevented such agreements from having any preemptive effect except in a lawsuit brought by the U.S. government itself. 2 '
Even though the federal government has never brought a lawsuit to enforce trade agreements against the states, the trade agreements do preserve the federal government's authority to preempt inconsistent state law by lawsuit. No such provision is found in the conditions attached to U.S. ratification of leading international human rights treaties, however. For instance, in ratifying the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the United States attached a federalism "understanding[]" stating that the treaty would be implemented by the federal government within its existing jurisdiction, "and otherwise by the state and local governments .... ,, 26 The understanding reflects the President's and Senate's belief that the treaty does not alter the existing division of authority between the federal and state governments. The explicit recognition that the states would be responsible for implementing the treaty with respect to those matters within their existing jurisdiction further indicates that the treaty does not provide the constitutional authority for federal legislation preempting matters currently controlled by the states. This suggestion has been strengthened in the most recent treaties approved by the U.S. Senate. Upon ratifying the recent Convention against Transnational Crime 1 7 in the fall of 2005, the U.S. Senate attached a reservation declaring that the U.S. government is not bound by the treaty to the extent it required the federal government to "address conduct which would fall within" a sphere of local activity governed exclusively by state law.2' In essence, the reservation removes any implication that the treaty could authorize federal preemptive authority over state activities, even if those activities affected the subject matter of the treaty. Similar reservations have been proposed for at least two other treaties under consideration by the Senate.' 29 By imposing federalism limitations upon the domestic effect of these international agreements, the federal government has deliberately deprived itself of a key tool to compel state compliance with its foreign policies. Treaties, executive agreements, and implementing statutes are the primary mechanisms by which the federal government preempts inconsistent state law. Accepting the imposition of the above federalism limitations, however, means that such treaties, international agreements, and statutes cannot be used to compel state adherence to national foreign policy goals.
Because the federal government has effectively handcuffed itself from preempting state activity in many areas involving foreign policy, the state governments are the only governmental institutions in the United States authorized to fulfill those U.S. treaty obligations. As I have suggested, this often means that governors will be left with the sole power to decide whether and how to respond to foreign demands under the treaties. 
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF GUBERNATORIAL FOREIGN POLICY
The emergence of a system of gubernatorial foreign policy will be controversial. In the broader debate over foreign affairs federalism, scholars have pointed out the practical difficulties of permitting states to develop independent and potentially inconsistent foreign policies. They have argued that the U.S. constitutional system is premised on the maintenance of "one voice" with respect to matters affecting foreign affairs. Notwithstanding the force of the "one voice" argument, this Part offers a pragmatic functional defense of allowing a system of gubernatorial foreign policy to arise.
A. Building a Gubernatorial Foreign Policy Capacity
The very term "gubernatorial foreign policy" may seem paradoxical because governors do not seem to have the capacity to handle the intricacies of foreign policy. Although four out of the last five U.S. Presidents served as governors prior to taking office, 13° none of them claimed to have gained extensive experience in foreign affairs during their terms as governor. But it is worth noting that modern state executives are developing the capacity and experience to participate directly in the flow and ebb of foreign relations.
For instance, a number of states have established overseas offices to represent their particularized interests in countries of special importance. Alabama, for instance, has established a field office in Heidelberg, Germany to promote the state's image in Europe and to strengthen ties with German automakers that have invested in the state.' 31 Virginia has established similar offices in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Japan to facilitate and encourage trade with East Asia. To be sure, such scattered developments hardly constitute a bureaucracy comparable to the foreign policy capacity of the federal government. But the yardstick for measuring the gubernatorial foreign policy capacity is not whether governors will have more expertise than the federal government's foreign policy bureaucracy. Plainly, governors will not. Rather, the question is whether governors will have a greater capacity to take foreign policy actions than would a state or federal court. In the traditional view, state governors are excluded from foreign affairs activities, but federal and state courts are then responsible for implementing U.S. obligations under a treaty, statute, or executive agreement. When making this comparison, at least, there are some reasons to believe that governors have a superior foreign policy capacity than federal and state courts.
For instance, when considering whether and how to implement the ICJ's judgment in Avena, Governor Henry and Oklahoma's highest criminal court simultaneously considered the proper way to respond. The Oklahoma court properly considered the effect of the consular rights treaty, the treaty obligations to the ICJ, and the effect on Torres's case. But sitting as a court, it could not consider the possible effects of noncompliance on Oklahoma's and the United States' relationship with Mexico and the ICJ. Overall, the Oklahoma court, like all courts, had a limited ability to gather information By contrast, the governor's office had greater access to information concerning the broader political context of the ICJ decision. It had the ability to directly and privately communicate with representatives from the Mexican and federal governments. This secrecy, combined with an ability to act with dispatch, affords governors numerous advantages in resolving this and other foreign policy issues that come within their limited purview.
B. Accommodating Globalization While Preserving Federalism
One might agree that governors have some limited foreign policy expertise but still believe that a centralized, exclusive federal foreign policy system that speaks with "one voice" would work more effectively. 137 The rise of globalization has only heightened the argument for one voice. States, for instance, have traditionally held independent authority to regulate such matters as gambling, local health and safety, and criminal punishment. The forces of globalization have exposed all of these areas to the prospect of international regulation.
1 " s
But it does not follow that internationalization requires nationalization. For instance, globalization has placed U.S. criminal punishment policies under international scrutiny. Both international courts and foreign governments have sought to modify the administration of the death penalty in the United States. The authority to change or modify those policies, however, lies primarily (and perhaps exclusively) with state governments. The simplest and most direct response to foreign government requests is action by the state governors in question. There is no functional necessity to bring the federal government into, for example, a dispute over Texas's process for hearing appeals of death 136. For a critique of courts in the administration of structural injunctions, see PETER H.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 150-84 (1983).
137. See 138. For instance, state policies in all of these areas have been challenged as inconsistent with international norms. See, e.g., Avena Judgment, supra note 1 (finding a treaty violation due to the United States' failure to provide a judicial hearing to challenge the effect of a consular rights violation on a capital punishment sentence).
sentences. The Governor of Texas can and does deal directly with foreign governments and is perfectly capable of changing or adjusting his or her policies in response to the foreign concerns. 1 3 9 Foreign governments are also perfectly capable of directly expressing their concerns to state governors. Supporters of "one voice" might respond that the foreign policy consequences of Texas's actions might affect all Americans, and not just Texans. This is a legitimate concern. But globalization has not only expanded the subjects of international concern; it has raised the profile of sub-national entities on the international stage. As Professor Spiro has argued, states have begun to achieve a substantial international presence in their own right. 4 ' The globalization of communications, trade, and travel has made it more likely that foreign nations can recognize the difference between a policy of the State of Texas and a policy of the State of New York.' 41 But even if gubernatorial actions abroad are not understood as the actions of a particular state, there still might be a justification for permitting a system of gubernatorial foreign policy. The need for one voice must be balanced against the United States' continuing commitment to a system of federalism. As globalization subjects more and more state policies to international scrutiny, the traditional theory of one voice would lead to the eventual nationalization of all of these areas of state policy.
One voice might be the most effective way to fulfill international goals, but it also threatens the dual system of sovereignties that the Supreme Court has gone to great pains to preserve. Moreover, as a political matter, the threat (real or imagined) of international control over state policies operates as another disincentive to U.S. participation in many international agreements. 14 2 In the long run, allowing the existence of a gubernatorial foreign policy operates as a (describing the rise of states as "demi-sovereigns"). Whether or not they are "demisovereigns," the trend Professor Spiro described seems quite real.
141. To provide just one example of foreign retaliation against a particular state rather than the whole United States, the United Kingdom adopted legislation retaliating against corporations from political subdivisions that employed a tax method that harmed U. pragmatic constitutional compromise between the internationalizing demands of globalization and the continuing conception of the United States as a federal system. The federal government continues to retain its authority to enter into international commitments, even commitments relating to matters that were previously controlled by the state governments. But the federal government leaves implementation of those obligations, along with the power to respond to greater international scrutiny of state policies, to the state governments, and to their chief executives in particular.
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this Essay is to give academic recognition to the potentially significant role of governors in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Governors are increasingly responsible for dealing with demands from foreign governments and international institutions. They negotiate and participate in certain limited forms of international agreement. They also execute state policies intended to impose sanctions on foreign countries. All of this represents an emerging system of gubernatorial foreign policy characterized by governors exercising independent decision-making power over matters affecting the foreign policy of the entire United States.
The system of gubernatorial foreign policy I have described does not conflict with traditional understandings of federal control over foreign affairs. Recent Supreme Court decisions have retreated from claims of federal exclusivity over foreign affairs and have shielded state officials from commandeering by the federal government. This doctrinal framework has left a small space for gubernatorial foreign policy, which the federal government has expanded through its practice of relying on states to carry out foreign policy obligations and by imposing limitations on the preemptive effects of treaties and international agreements.
In my view, a system of gubernatorial foreign policy is the most practical and feasible way to accommodate the internationalizing pressure of globalization with the traditional conception of federalism still extant in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. The states will continue to improve their capacity to deal with matters concerning foreign affairs that affect their traditional areas of jurisdiction. The federal government will retain the right to preempt, but not commandeer, state governments in the service of their foreign policy goals. As states continue to expand and exert their improved foreign affairs capacity, even this federal right to preempt may become less necessary so that, in the future, the federal government will rely more and more on state governors to carry out foreign affairs responsibilities. In this way, globalization and federalism can both survive and prosper well into the Constitution's third century.
